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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new evidence on the potential importance of 401(k) assets in contributing to
the retirement resources of future retirees.  We use data on past 401(k) participation rates by age and
income decile, along with information on average 401(k) contribution rates, to project the future 401(k)
contribution trajectories of households that are currently headed by individuals between the ages of 29 and
39.  We allow for the possibility of pre-retirement withdrawal of 401(k) assets when individuals experience
employment transitions.  By combining data from the Health and Retirement Survey on the likelihood of
"cashing out" a 401(k) account conditional on a job change, with data from other sources on the probability
of job change, it is possible to estimate the prospective pre-retirement "leakage" from 401(k) accounts.
Our central findings are that for households reaching retirement age between 2025 and 2035, 401(k)
balances are likely to be a much more important factor in financial preparation for retirement than they are
today.  We estimate that average 401(k) balances in 2025 will be between five and ten times as large as
they are today, and would represent one-half to twice Social Security wealth (depending on investment
allocation and based on current Social Security provisions).  For persons retiring in 2035 we estimate that
401(k) balances will be three-quarters to two and one-half times Social Security wealth.  Moreover, we
find that pre-retirement withdrawals have a small effect on the balance in 401(k) accounts.  We estimate
that these withdrawals typically reduce average 401(k) assets at age 65 by about five percent.  This is
largely because most households who are eligible for a lump sum distribution when they change jobs choose
to keep their accumulated 401(k) assets in the retirement saving system.  These households either leave
their assets in their previous employer's 401(k) plan, or they roll the assets over to another retirement saving
account, such as a new 401(k) or an Individual Retirement Account.  Most of those who do withdraw
assets have very small accumulated balances.  By comparison, the expense ratio charged by the financial
institutions administering 401(k) accounts has a larger effect on retirement resources than the possibility of
pre-retirement withdrawal.
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Historically, households in the United States have relied on a combinationof Social
Security, employer-provided defined benefit pensions, and personal savingto support
their retirement years. In the last fifteen years, however, retirement saving programs
such as 401(k) plans have become an increasingly common component ofhousehold
retirement planning. Today, more than 35 million workers participate in 401(k) saving
plans, and the annual contribution flow to these plansexceeds $100 billion. The tax-
deferred nature of wealth accumulation in 401(k)-type plans, coupled with often
generous employer matching contributionsthat enhance the value of employee
contributions, make these plans a powerful vehicle for accumulating retirementwealth.
Mass market books, such as lwaszko and O'Connell (1999) and Merritt (1997),have
extolled the wealth-building power of 401(k) accounts.
In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (hereafter PVW)[1998a],we showed that even with
conservative assumptions about the future growth of 40 1(k) contributions, the average
40 1(k) balance for households reaching retirement in 2025 will be approximately equal
to the average actuarial present value of Social Security benefits. This represents
roughly a ten-fold increase in the importance of 401(k)accumulations between the late
1990s and 2025.
Although 401(k) plan accumulations are likely to account for a verysubstantial
share of the net worth of future retirees, unlike Social Security benefits, they canbe
affected by a number of individual decisions. Individuals who work at firms thatoffer
401(k) plans must decide whether or not to participate in their employer's plan.Those
who do not participate forego the opportunity to accumulate retirement wealth in this
Page2tax-deferred form. Conditional on participating, individuals must decide how much of
their earnings to contribute to the plan.
When 401(k) participants leave jobs at which they have participated in a 401(k)
plan, they can withdraw their accumulated 401(k) assets from the retirement saving
system. When such withdrawals occur before the recipient is 59 1/2, they are taxed as
ordinary income, as all 401(k) payouts are, and they are also subject to a 10 percent
"early withdrawal" penalty tax. Participants who leave their jobs can also choose to
leave their 401(k) accumulation in their former employer's plan, or to roll-over their
assets either into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or into the 40 1(k) plan of a
new employer. The flexibility afforded by these three options enhances the portability
of 401(k) benefits. It reduces the risk, not uncommon in defined benefit pension plans,
of forfeiting pension benefits as a result of job change. However, the flexibility
associated with the 401(k) withdrawal option raises the possibility that 401(k)
participants may draw down their account balances before retirement, and thereby
reach retirement without assets in a 401(k) account.
A number of recent studies have noted that conditional on choosing to withdraw
assets from the 401(k) system, i.e. conditional on receiving a "lump sum distribution,"
many individuals use their withdrawal in a way that does not preserve retirement saving.
In PVW [1998b], we showed, however, that older workers, and those who receive larger
lump sum distributions, are much more likely to preserve the retirement benefits of their
lump sum distributions through IRA rollovers or other forms of saving. These findings,
based on data from the current Population Survey, are confirmed in Sabeihaus and
Weiner's (1999) analysis of tax return information.
Until recently, there was no information on the probability that a worker leaving a
Page3job would decide to withdraw assets from the employer's 401(k) plan and therefore
receive a lump-sum distribution. Analyzing the behavior of those who received lump
sum distributions therefore provided only a partial account of benefit leakage from
401(k) plans. In an important recent study, however, Hurd, Lillard, and Panis [19981
analyze data on the disposition of defined contribution pension assets when workers
change jobs. They analyze information from the Health and Retirement Survey and
find that very few participants in these pension plans select the withdrawal option when
they leave their jobs.
In this paper we draw together previous research on withdrawals from retirement
saving plans to gauge the importance of such withdrawals on the saving balances of
future retirees. We expand the algorithm for projecting future 401(k) balances that we
developed in PVW (1998a) to allow for job changes during an individual's working life,
and the associated risk of 401(k) asset withdrawal. While we abstract from many
detailed features of the asset withdrawal process, we allow for age-specific job
termination risks, and for balance-specific probabilities of withdrawing assets from a
40 1(k) account. We also allow for realistic expenses of managing the assets in 40 1(k)
plans.
We find that even though a substantial number of workers change jobs, and
could withdraw their 401(k) assets, the modest withdrawal rate and the small size of
most withdrawals reduce retirement saving only modestly. Our central estimates
suggest that the opportunity to take 401(k) withdrawals reduces retirement saving at
retirement by approximately five percent. Even after allowing for pre-retirement
withdrawals, we find that 40 1(k) saving will expand rapidly over the next three decades,
and that 401(k) assets at retirement are likely to grow, on average, to be roughly as
Page4important as current Social Security wealth in contributing to households' retirement
financing.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first summarizes the recent studies
that have explored the importance of lump sum distributions from 401(k) plans and
other retirement saving plans. The second section describes our algorithm for
projecting the 401(k) balances of future cohorts of retirees, and particularly our attempts
to allow for pre-retirement asset withdrawals. We calibrate our model using data from
the 1993 Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Health and Retirement
Survey. Section three presents evidence on how actual 401(k) balances for households
in the Health and Retirement Survey compare with the balances that our algorithm
would have predicted for these households, had we not known their actual plan
balance. The fourth section reports our projected future account balances and
examines the importance of pie-retirement withdrawals in affecting these balances.
Section five reports preliminary statistics on 401(k) participation from the 1995 Survey
of Income and Program Participation, and uses these data to provide some indication of
the plausibility of our projected rates of 401(k) expansion. Finally, a brief concluding
section suggests several directions for further work.
1. What Do We Know About Lump Sum Distributions and 401(k) "Leakage"?
The growth of retirement saving accounts, in particular 401(k) accounts, during
the last two decades has substantially expanded the financial assets of many U.S.
households. The expansion of personal retirement saving has raised new questions
about the impact of individual financial decisions on preparation for retirement. Poterba
and Wise (1999) note that there are several dimensions, including plan participation,
Page5contribution level, asset allocation, date of asset withdrawal, and whether or not to
annuitize account payouts, along which individuals can influence their 401(k) retirement
accumulation.
One of the most important decisions individuals face is whether to draw down
assets in retirement saving accounts before retirement. A number of summary
statistics on the prevalence of lump sum distributions have raised concern about the
possibility that households are not preserving their retirement saving. The most recent
data on the extent and use of such distributions are from the U.S. Department of Labor
[1995]. The data are based on the September 1994 "Retiree Pension and Health
Benefits Supplement" to the Current Population Survey. This survey shows that 9.1
million individuals (all over the age of 40) reported that they had received at least one
lump sum distribution from a pension plan or retirement saving account. This is nearly
ten percent of the over-40 population, and it is an even greater share of the labor force
in this age range.
The mean lump sum distribution, measured in 1994 dollars, was $22,309. More
than half of these distributions (52.8 percent) were received by workers who were
between the ages of 30 and 49 at the time of the distribution. The CPS questionnaire
included information on lump sum distributions from a range of different retirement
plans. Payouts from defined benefit plans in which the separating employee had
accumulated only a small vested pension benefit, from traditional defined contribution
pension plans, as well as from 401(k)-like retirement saving programs were included in
the CPS survey. Of the 9.1 million lump sum distributions reported in the survey, 2.7
million were identified as from defined benefit plans, 5.3 million were from defined
contribution plans, and 1.1 million distributions were received by individuals who could
Page6not identify the type of plan that they were from.
Probably the greatest concern with the substantial number of lump sum
distributions is that many of their recipients report that they did not use their
distributions to provide income in retirement. Table 1 shows the uses lump sum
distributions reported in the 1994 Current Population Survey supplement. More than
one quarter of those who reported a single primary use of their lump sum distribution
(1 .82 million of the 6.86 million respondents with a primary use) indicated that their
distribution was used to finance a consumer durable purchase or to pay other
expenses. Only 33.9 percent reported that they rolled-over their lump sum distribution
into an IRA or a retirement plan with a new employer. A substantial additional group,
comprising 39.5 percent of the primary-use respondents, indicated that their distribution
was used for something that could be construed as saving, but was not targeted for
retirement income support. Responses in this category include depositing the lump
sum distribution in a saving account, paying off debts, or using the proceeds for home
renovations.
Previous work, including Chang (1996) and PVW (1998b), has shown that the
use to which a lump sum distribution is put is a function of household age and the size
of the distribution. Thus an asset-weighted version of Table 1 would show a different
allocation of lump sum distributions than the person-weighted tabulation that is actually
reported in the table. Older workers, and those with larger distributed balances, are
more likely to choose a rollover option or to report that they saved their distribution.
The fraction of lump sum distribution dollars that are withdrawn from the 401(k) system
is much smaller than the fraction of individuals who receive lump sum distributions who
report that they withdrew funds from their retirement saving. There is also some
Page7evidence, reported for example in Bassett, Fleming, and Rodriguez (1998), and Chang
(1996) that the share of lump sum distributions that are rolled over into saving vehicles
or new retirement saving accounts has increased over time.
The critical difficulty with using data on lump sum distributions to study asset
leakage from the 401(k) system is that individuals who leave jobs with 401(k) plans can
choose whether or not to receive a lump sum distribution. The sample of lump sum
distribution recipients provides no insight on the probability that an individual
experiencing a job separation will decide to withdraw funds from the 401(k) system.
The individual could also choose to allow the 401(k) balance to remain with the
previous employer, or to roll the 401(k) balance into a 401(k) plan at a new employer.
Neither of these options would trigger a lump sum distribution. If most individuals
experiencing a job separation choose one of these options, then the probability of
401(k) leakage might be quite small even if most of those taking lump sum distributions
do not roll over their 401(k) assets.
Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) use data on individuals in the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS) who experience a job change between either the first and
second survey waves, or between the second and third waves, to estimate the
probability of asset withdrawal. Their findings show that only 20.5 percent of the
workers leaving defined contribution pension plans (including 401(k) plans), and 16.4
percent of those leaving jobs with defined benefit plans, choose to cash out their
accumulations in the form of lump sum distributions. Moreover, the cash-out probability
is lower for those with large balances. Only 6.7 percent of the assets held in defined
contribution plans by those who experience job termination are withdrawn from the
retirement saving system. These statistics suggest that the possibility of withdrawing
Page8assets from a 401(k) plan is not likely to have a large impact on the prospective growth
of assets in these plans.
Engelhardt (1999) performs a related calculation using data from the HRS.
Using data on individual reports of past lump sum distributions, he "accumulates" the
value of these withdrawals under the counter-factual assumption that they had been left
in retirement saving accounts. He finds that for the median household that received a
lump sum distribution, the current value of this distribution is between 8 and 11 percent
of the value of Social Security wealth and other pension wealth. The range depends on
assumptions about the way 401(k) participants invest their assets.
These findings suggest that lump sum distributions from 401(k)-type plans have
probably not had a large effect on the accumulated balances in these retirement saving
accounts. However, it is still possible that such distributions will have a larger effect on
future accumulations in these accounts, since 401(k) plans will be available to more
young workers in the future than in the past. Young workers have much higher job
turnover rates than older workers. The calculations we present below are designed to
provide new insight on the prospective importance of such pre-retirement payouts.
2. An Algorithm for Projecting Future 401(k) Balances
This section describes our approach to forecasting the 401(k) balances at
retirement for currently working cohorts. We build on our prior work, reported in PVW
(1998a), but expand our previous algorithm to incorporate job change, lump sum
distributions, and potential asset leakage from the 401(k) system into our analysis. We
also introduce administrative costs of asset management into our forecasting algorithm.
Page9Our procedure for projecting the 401(k) assets of future retirees relies on a
cohort representation of data on 401(k) participation and contribution behavior. The
notation C(j) refers to the cohort of age j in 1984. C(27), for example, refers to the
cohort aged 27 in 1984. Figure 1, which is reproduced from our earlier paper, shows
401(k) eligibility rates for six cohorts that are based on SIPP data for 1984, 1987, 1991,
and 1993. Our analysis focuses on the C(25) and C(15) cohorts, which were 33 and
23, respectively, in 1993. For the C(25) cohort, age 55 occurs in 2015, and age 65 in
2025. The C(15) cohort reaches each of these ages ten years later.
To ensure adequate sample sizes, each of the "cohort" points plotted in Figure 1
is based on a group of families with household heads born in a five-year interval. The
C(25) cohort therefore includes families with heads aged 23-27 in 1984. The C(25)
cohort is identified by the oval symbols. The eligibility rate of this cohort was roughly
15% in 1 984, but it had risen to almost 45% by 1993 when the cohort was 33 years old.
A similar increase in eligibility is evident for each of the other five cohorts. It is also
clear that there is a very large "cohort effect". At any age each successively younger
cohort has a higher contribution rate than the cohort five years older. This difference is
approximately 20 percentage points. For example, 44% of the C(27) cohort was
401(k)-eligible when this cohort was 35 years old, compared with about 20% of the five-
year-older C(32) cohort when it was 35.
The information in Figure 1 illustrates the cross-section relationship between age
and eligibility at each survey date. The seven markers along the top of the figure
represent the 1993 cross-section relationship, between age and eligibility. It shows
rising eligibility at young ages, followed by a plateau. Comparable data for earlier years
show a less pronounced effect of age on eligibility.
Page102.1 Projecting Future 401(k) Participation Rates
Extrapolation of cohort trends would quickly lead to the implausible projection of
eligibility rates of over 100%. On the other hand, it is equally clear that when the C(27)
cohort reaches age 40 its eligibility rate will be greater than the rate of the C(32) cohort
at age 40. Thus instead of extrapolating the cohort data, we parameterize the
relationship between age and eligibility, assuming that the apparent cohort effects in the
figure are year effects and simply represent the spread of 401(k)s with time. With
reference to Figure 1, this means that we estimate eligibility by allowing the cross-
section relationship to shift upward over time. When we allow for both cohort and year
effects in regression equations in which 401(k) participation rates are the dependent
variables, the cohort effects are typically not statistically significantly different from zero
and the time effects exhibit most of the explanatory power.
The difficulty with extrapolating past experience to project future 401(k) balances
can be illustrated by reference to the C(27) cohort. If 401(k) plans continue to spread,
then the 1993 cross-sectional relationship between eligibility and age will clearly
understate the future eligibility of the C(27) cohort. In part this is simply because
401(k)s will undoubtedly continue to expand. But, in addition, the 1993 relationship is
determined in part by how the past diffusion of 401(k) plans occurred. If the diffusion of
plans has been slower in small firms with younger workers than in large firms, then the
cross-section relationship would tend to look as it does in the figure. In the 1993 cross-
section there is a noticeable reduction in eligibility with age. This is much less apparent
in the 1984 cross-section. Thus we can only use formal estimates as a guide to future
patterns.
We assume that by 2013, which is twenty years after the 1993 survey on which
Pageiiour data are based, the eligibility rate for 55-year-olds (the C(27) cohort) will be 50
percent higher than the eligibility rate of the cohort that was 55 in 1993. This
assumption is based on the past growth in eligibility and participation rates reported on
IRS Form 5500 and in Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Form 5500 reports1
show that the number of 401(k) participants increased by 52 percent over the five-year
period between 1988 and 1993. Employment grew by 4% over this period. Data from
the CPS show a 45% increase in the participation rate in 401(k) plans, which is roughly
consistent with the Form 5500 data. The Form 5500 data also show that aggregate
401(k) contributions increased by 76 percent, or by much more than the increase in
participation. Aggregate earnings increased about 25% over this period, so if the
average fraction of earnings contributed were stable, the growth in earnings and
participation would predict a 77 percent increase in aggregate contributions. This is
very similar to the observed change.
2.2Cross-sectional Age-Participation Profiles and Participation Projections
Our projections are based on recent 401(k) participation data along with
assumptions on the future evolution of both eligibility and participation. We recognize
throughout our analysis that there is an important relationship between earnings,
eligibility, and participation, and we allow for this by estimating cross-sectional probit
equations relating eligibility or participation to age and indicator variables for earnings




where A is age and the Dd are indicator variables which identify the household's
earnings decile. The most important parameters are the Yd ,which indicate the effect of
Page12earnings decile Dd on participation. These coefficients are the basis for our stratification
of 401(k) accumulation patterns by household earnings. In PVW [1 998a}, we report
estimation results from models like (1) for eligibility, participation given eligibility, and
participation, using 1988 and 1993 SIPP data. We do not reproduce those results here.
We use our projection algorithm to explore future 401(k) balances for
households headed by individuals in the C(25) cohort, the C(15) cohort, and for a
cohort that is exposed to a mandatory 401(k)-type program with universal contributions.
The last case resembles some of the proposals that have recently been discussed in
the U.S. Social Security reform debate.
To project future 401(k) asset accumulation for the C(25) cohort, we assume that
when this cohort is 55 years old (in 2015) it will have a 401(k) participation rate 50
percent higher than that of the cohort that was 55 in 1993. We further assume that its
participation rate at 65 will be five percent higher than this, that is, 55 percent higher
than that of the cohort that was 55 in 1993. The projections by earnings decile start
from the 1993 401(k) participation rates. Because higher income households have
higher participation rates, the projections yield a widening difference between the
participation rates of high- and low-income families as they age. Tthe extent of this
dispersion is likely to be one of the most uncertain features of our projections.
Figure 2, also drawn from PVW (1998a), illustrates the C(25) projection, as well
as the C(15) projection. To further place the projections in the context of the historical
data, a projection for the C(27) cohort is also shown in the figure.
The members of the C(15) cohort were 15 years old in 1984. Even though this
cohort is only ten years younger than the C(25) cohort, we find it substantially more
difficult to make plausible assumptions about their future 401(k) participation rates. We
Page13think of the C(15) projections as representing 401(k) accumulation in a setting in which
participation is substantially higher than with the C(25) projections, but considerably
short of universal coverage. We believe that future 40 1(k) participation will indeed be
higher than the C(25) projections suggest. Our C(1 5) projections assume that 401(k)
participation rates for the median wage earner are 20 percentage points greater than
the C(25) rates. Rates for the highest and lowest decile workers in the C(1 5) cohort are
assumed to be slightly less than twenty percent greater than those of comparable
workers in the C(25) cohort.2 This twenty percentage point increase in 401(k)
participation for cohorts ten years apart is modest compared with what we have
observed in recent years. In Figure 1, for example, we find that 401(k) eligibility has
risen by twenty percentage points for cohorts only five years apart. Our projections
therefore assume future 401(k) eligibility growth at roughly half the recent rate.
Finally, we consider a third scenario for future 40 1(k) growth, in which everyone
contributes a fixed share of their salary to a 401(k) plan. Universal coverage might
arise if 401 (k)s spread even more rapidly in the future than they have in the past, or it
might arise as part of a mandatory saving program. Various types of mandatory saving
systems have been suggested as one way to address the prospective funding
difficulties of the Social Security system.
2.3Earnings Histories
Our projections of future 401(k) balances assume that all households that
contribute to a 401(k) plan contribute nine percent of their earnings. In PVW (1 998a),
we show that the average contribution rate as a share of earnings is extremely stable
across earnings deciles. There is, of course great variation across households within
deciles, but we are primarily interested in forecasting averages. A household's earnings
Page14history is therefore a critical determinant of its 401(k) accumulation.
The starting point of our algorithm is a set of "pseudo-earnings histories" of
Health and Retirement Survey respondents beginning at age 25. In analyzing the HRS
earnings histories, we have divided the families in the HRS into deciles according to
their 1992 earnings. In principle, the Social Security earnings histories of the HRS
respondents can be used to determine average earnings by age within each decile.
Venti and Wise (1997) note, however, that there is one important limitation to this
method. Historical earnings are reported only up to the Social Security earnings limit,
while actual earnings in the top two or three deciles may be substantially higher than
Social Security reported earnings. Because of this limitation, we rely on information in
the annual March Current Population Survey (CPS) data files, which report earnings
well above the Social Security maximum.3 The ratio of the CPS maximum to the Social
Security maximum has ranged from a low of just under 2 in 1981 to a high of over 20 in
1964. In 1991 the CPS reported earnings up to a maximum of $200,000, while the
Social Security maximum was $53,400.
Our procedure for constructing earnings histories for HRS households is as
follows. We first identify earnings deciles, as described above, using the 1992 earnings
of each HRS family. Then, using the March CPS data we calculate earnings deciles by
age for the years 1964-91. Using published data on median earnings prior to 1964, we
extrapolate this series back to 1956, thereby obtaining earnings histories by decile for
the years 1956 to 1991.Finally, we assign each HRS household to a CPS decile
according to the household's 1992 earnings decile. The CPS earnings histories begin
at age 25 and a given household is assumed to have been in the same decile since age
25.
Page152.4 The Projection Algorithm
Given a household's "pseudo-earnings history," we construct a "pseudo-401 (k)
contribution record." Within each earnings decile, each household is randomly
assigned to 401(k) participation status, based on the 401(k) participation probabilities
discussed above. Then, as the household ages, we vary its 401(k) participation status.
In PVW (1 998a), we assumed that if a household had a 40 1(k) account at a given age,
it remained a 401(k) participant until retirement. In the present paper, we allow for job
separations that lead some 401(k) participants to become non-participants.
To illustrate the procedure, we suppress variation across earnings deciles, which
we use in our actual projections. We define a as the participation rate in 401(k) plans
at age a. Suppose that La is the probability that an a-year-old person with a 401(k)
plan leaves his employer. This event will end a 401(k)-participation spell, although it is
possible that another 401(k) participation spell will begin when the affected individual
finds another job.
The difference between the fraction of the population participating in 401(k)
accounts at ages a and a+1 reflects two offsetting flows. These are the fraction of the
population that enters 401(k) participation at age a, Ea, and the fraction of the
population that participated in a 401(k) plan at age a, but left the 401(k) system by age
a+1. The fraction of the population that leaves a 401(k) job at age a is La*Pa. The net
change in 401(k) participation at age a is therefore:
(2)Pa+1_PaEa_LaPa
Weknow the values of a+l and a' and we can estimate the probability of job leaving.
We can therefore derive the flow of new entrants to the 401(k) system that is necessary
Page16to generate observed age-specific participation rates. This is just
(3) Ea=1a+i1a(1La)
wherea denotes the probability of 401(k) participation at the beginning of the year
when a cohort is age a, and La denotes the probability of leaving 401(k) participation
during the year when the cohort is age a.
New 401(k) entrants must be drawn from the non-participant pool at age a. The
probability that an a-year-old nonparticipant will join a 401(k) plan (ia)issimply the
ratio of the fraction of the population that represents new 401(k) entrants, Ea, to the




Itis possible for someone who joins the 401(k) participant group to be a previous
401(k) participant. This means that the number of current 401(k) participants will, in
general, differ from the number of individuals who have ever participated in a 401(k). It
also implies that some new entrants to 401(k) participation at age a will have positive
401(k) balances as a result of 401(k) participation on a prior job.
We should note in passing that this algorithm for projecting the evolution of
40 1(k) participation corrects a previous modeling error. If there is no chance of leaving
a 401(k) job, so La =0 as in our previous work, thenJa =(+1 — P1)/ (1— P), from
equation (4). In PVW(1998a), we incorrectly set the probability that non-participants
would become 401(k) participants to (P1 —. Thus we underestimated the
Page17probability of joining a 401(k) plan, which had the effect of understating the fraction of
currently young households who would participate in a 401(k) plan before retirement.
This under-estimated the future importance of 401(k) account balances. We note the
size of this error below.
Our projections consider three possible rate of return scenarios, corresponding
to nominal rates of return of 6 percent, 9.3 percent, and 12.7 percent on 401(k) assets.
We think of these returns as the returns, on average, on an all bond portfolio, a 50-50
split between bonds and stocks, and an all stock portfolio. Ibbotson Associates (1997)
reports that the historical average pretax return on corporate bonds has been 6 percent
per year, while large-capitalization stocks have returned an average of 12.7 percent per
year since 1926. These returns are the pretax returns available on a portfolio with no
management fees. Because most 401(k) plans are administered by financial
intermediaries who charge for their services, we also consider the effect of reducing the
feasible return on the bond portfolio by 35 basis points, and the return on the equity
portfolio by 70 basis points. Our calculations highlight the importance of such asset
management costs in determining 401(k) wealth at retirement.
We also demonstrate the effect of the randomness of stock and bond returns.
We do this by drawing annual returns for our bond and stock portfolios from the
empirical distributions of returns on corporate bonds, and large company stocks, in
Ibbotson Associates (1997). We construct 1000 projections using this random draw
algorithm, and then show the distribution of returns, It is important to emphasize that
randomness represents macro variation, which affect all plan members. We do not
account for variation among participants due to differences in asset allocation among
our three assets. Nor do we give attention to individual variation within earnings deciles
Page18due to different 401(k) participation rates. And, of course, we do not account for
additional variation that would result from investment in individual stocks for example.
In future work we will address this individual risk.
We now turn to the problem of modeling the dynamics of 401(k) account
balances. When a household leaves a job with a 40 1(k) plan, one of two things may
happen to the accumulated asset balance. In principle, a job leaver could decide to
divide a 401(k) accumulation between these alternatives, but we assume that there are
no fractional account balances.
First, the job-leaver may decide to preserve the assets in the retirement system.
They could leave the assets in the former employer's 401(k) plan, although no further
contributions would be made, or to roll the assets over into an IRA. In this case, the
assets will continue to accumulate until retirement. We use 1Qa to denote the
probability that 40 1(k) assets remain in the retirement system at the time of a job
transition.
Second, with probability a' a job changer can decide to withdraw the assets
from the 401(k) system. This would trigger a lump sum distribution, and would create
"leakage" from the stock of retirement assets. We use the notation Aa to define 401 (k)
plan assets for a household of age a, and Ba to denote the asset balance of job leavers
who cash out their 401(k) assets. We allow Qa to depend on the size of the 401(k)
account balance (Aa)atthe time of the job termination, so a a (Aa).
The equation for the evolution of 401(k) balances is therefore:
(5)Aa+iAa(l+r)+Ca+i+iJa+iBa.
Page19where Ca+i denotes the 401(k) contribution rate as a fraction of income, and
1a+1 denotes household income. We can express Ba as the product of three terms:
(6)Ba =AaLa Qa (Aa),
Theseare respectively the 401(k) balance at the beginning of the year when a cohort
turns age a, the probability of leaving the 401(k) job during that year, and the probability
of withdrawing the balance conditional on leaving the job. We allow the job-leaving
probability to vary with age, and the probability of asset withdrawal conditional on job
separation to depend on the accumulated asset balance. We calculate Qa separately
for each household, so it depends on each household's accumulated 401(k) balance.
In future work we hope to expand the set of household characteristics that affect each
of these probabilities.
2.5 Calibrating the Rates of Job Separation and Cash-Out
Two key parameters that determine the magnitude of 401(k) leakage are the
age-specific job leaving probability, La, and the asset-balance-specific probability of
cashing out a 401(k) plan balance, Qa(Aa).
There is a substantial literature on both the rate at which jobs end, and the
characteristics of individuals and jobs that are associated with job termination. For
example, Farber (1997) reports age-specific rates of job losing, and Neumark, Polsky,
and Hansen (1999) present recent evidence on both job turnover rates and job tenure
distributions from the Current Population Survey. None of the existing literature
provides precisely the values of La that we require. This is because we are interested in
job termination rates for employees at firms that offer 401(k) plans. Some previous
Page20evidence suggests that job termination rates are lower at firms that offer pension plans,
and that termination rates are also declining in the length of the job's tenure. Gustman
and Steinmeier (1995) report, for example, that in the 1984 and 1985 Surveys of
Income and Program Participation, men aged 31-50 without a pension had a 19.5
percent annual separation rate. In the same data set, men with either a defined benefit
or an defined contribution pension plan had a 6.1 percent separation rate.
To provide more recent evidence on mobility rates, we analyzed data from the
retrospective section of the Health and Retirement Survey. By working backwards from
the current job, it is possible to assemble information on both pension coverage on
previous jobs, and on the respondent's age at the time when the job ended. Table 2
reports our findings for separation rates at jobs with defined contribution pension plans.
The job mobility rates are much lower than those in most other studies of labor market
turnover. For 40-year-old men, for example, the rate is only 1.2 percent per year. This
may be an artifact of the long-term retrospective nature of the HRS questions, or it may
be the result of other factors.
Since we are not sure why the HRS-based mobility rates are so low, and since
very low mobility rates will make the risk of withdrawals from the 401 (k) system seem
very small, we are reluctant to use the HRS findings without some modification. We
have therefore assumed that the job-leaving probability (La) for persons aged 25-34 is 6
percent. We assume that this probability declines to 4.5 percent for those aged 35-44,
4 percent for those aged 45-54, and then rises to 5 percent for those aged 55-64. We
believe that a case can be made for using even lower mobility rates, in which case the
impact of potential 401(k) leakage would be even smaller than our findings below
suggest.
Page21In calibrating Qa(Aa), the probability of withdrawing assets from a 401(k) plan as a
function of the accumulated asset balance, we rely on the work of Hurd, Lillard, and
Panis (1998). They provide the only comprehensive analysis of dispositions from
defined contribution plans. Their analysis uses the Health and Retirement Survey to
calculate the probability of various uses of existing defined contribution plan balances
conditional on a job separation. We treat their probabilities of retaining an account
through the former employer's 401(k) plan (their probabilities refer to all defined
contribution plans), rolling assets over into an IRA or other tax-advantaged saving
vehicle, and annuitizing the 401(k) balance, as "rollovers." Each of these dispositions
has, in a different way, the effect of preserving the 401(k) balance so that the assets
can be used to support retirement consumption. A fourth option in their classification
scheme, cashing out the 401(k) balance, is the one that we regard as triggering asset
leakage from the 401(k) system.
Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) find that the likelihood of cashing out is strongly
related to the size of the 401(k) account balance. They provided us with unpublished
tabulations that indicate the cash-out probabilities for various 401(k) balances, as well
as the number of observations in the HRS dataset that were used to estimate each of
these balance-specific probabilities. Table 3 reports these probabilities and associated
summary statistics. We use the data in Table 3 to randomly assign the balances of job
leavers to cash-out or rollover status.
One difficulty that arises in using a set of balance-specific probabilities for asset
withdrawal, as we do here, is that the Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) findings relate to
balances at a single point in time. We need to apply them to potential 401(k) cash-outs
over an entire working lifetime. To do this we assume that 401(k) balances at different
Page22dates can be converted to balances in 1992 dollars using a 3.2 percent annual inflation
rate.
3.Validating the Algorithm: Projecting 401(k) BalancesforCurrent HRS
Households
Before projecting the 401(k) assets at retirement for future cohorts of retirees, we
tried to evaluate the ability of our algorithm to predict the observed 40 1(k) balances of
current cohorts of retirees and near-retirees. We use our algorithm to predict 401(k)
balances for households in the Health and Retirement Survey. We did this using a
"basic" version of our algorithm, without any administrative costs for 401(k) asset
management and with certain returns. In essence, we ask whether the SIPP cohort
data on 40 1(k) participation, together with the CPS data on contributions, can explain
the observed distribution of 401(k) balances in the HRS. While a high correspondence
between actual and predicted values in this case does not necessarily demonstrate the
validity of our algorithm, it provides at least one way of checking for the plausibility of
our findings.
Table 4 reports the mean 1992 assets of the HRS respondents, stratified
according to earnings decile. (This table is drawn from PVW (1998a). It provides a
point of reference against which to evaluate our projected 401(k) balances. The table
reports only mean asset balances because our 401(k) balance projections focus on
means. While the median asset holdings for many categories are substantially beTow
the mean holdings, the primary comparison that we make is between 401(k) balances
and Social Security wealth. Mean and median Social Security wealth are very similar.
We estimate accrued Social Security wealth at age 65 for the HRS respondents,
assuming that each respondent were to work until that age. A family's Social Security
Page23wealth is the simple sum of the mortality weighted present value of each member's
benefit stream; we do not consider survivorship benefits, which could raise the total
value of Social Security wealth by more than one third. These accrued benefit levels
are converted to 1992 dollars using the Social Security Administration's intermediate
forecast of the average annual interest rate provided by the Board of Trustees of the
OASDI trust fund. For comparability, the projected 401(k) balances discussed below
also assume that a person works until age 65. The actual HRS 401(k) balances
reported in Table 4, however, are 1992 balances when the respondents were 51 to 61.
Personal retirement balances could easily double by the time the respondents attain
age 65, through the combined effect of asset returns and additional contributions during
remaining years of employment.
When the 401(k) program began in 1982, members of the 1992 HRS sample
were 41 to 51 years old. We assume that in 1982, these families began to participate
in 401(k) plans at rates estimated from the SIPP and to contribute at rates estimated
from the CPS. We ask how close simulated balances based on these assumptions are
to the actual 1992 balances of the HRS respondents.
We first use the SIPP data to estimate participation profiles by age for the
cohorts whose members were 51 to 55 and 56 to 60 in 1992, at the time of the HRS.
Then, to estimate contributions, we use family earnings histories, derived as described
above. Within each earnings decile, beginning in 1982, we randomly assign families to
participation status, based on SIPP estimates of participation by age and earnings
decile for each of the two cohorts.5 We then randomly assign job change and cash-out
status, also as described above. Based on our estimates from the CPS data, we
assume a contribution rate of eight percent in all years between 1982 and 1992. This is
Page24somewhat less than the average rate of 8.7 percent -- including both employee and
employer matching contributions -- reported in the 1993 CPS data, and the nine percent
rate that we assume throughout our projections of future 40 1(k) balances. This is
because there is some evidence that 401(k) contribution rates have increased over
time, and we are trying to track the 1982-1992 experience.
Table 5 shows our projected 401(k) balances, as of 1992, for the HRS sample.
This table is similar to a table in PVW(1998a),but it is based on an algorithm that
allows for job terminations. The table reports results stratified by earnings decile. On
average the simulated values do not differ greatly from the observed balances reported
in the HRS. Using the bond rate of return seems to give the closest match. Even the
simulated balances by earnings decile are typically not far from the HRS reported
balances. These results suggest that with roughly accurate assumptions about
contribution and participation behavior, we are able to replicate the actual distribution of
401(k) balances. We do not necessarily view our ability to track the p evolution of
401(k) balances as a strong endorsement for the future success of our algorithm,
because our historical success does not provide any evidence that our assumptions for
the future are plausible.
4. Projections of 401(k) Balances of Future Retirees
We now use our projection algorithm to estimate the balances at age 65 of future
cohorts. We assume that our estimated earnings profiles represent the past earnings
of the HRS families, and we estimate what they would have accumulated in a 40 1(k)
had they had the participation rates that we project for the 0(25) and the C(1 5) cohorts.
We also consider what would have happened if there had been universal 40 1(k)
coverage in past years. The projections reported below assume a 35 basis point
Page25annual administrative cost on 401(k) investments in bonds, and a 70 basis point cost on
stock investments.
Table 6 reports the results of our projections for the C(25) cohort, the group that
will turn 65 in 2025. The first column of the table shows the average value of Social
Security wealth for each earnings decile. The remaining columns show our projected
401(k) balances when the C(25) cohort reaches age 65. These values are reported in
1992 dollars, for comparability with the first column. Our projected 401(k) balances are
the pretax balances in 401(k) accounts. A family with these balances would pay taxes
as the 40 1(k) balance was drawn down, so the after-tax value of the 40 1(k)
accumulation is smaller than what we report. In contrast, no tax will be paid on most
Social Security benefits. To place our estimates in perspective, it is helpful to refer to
the family wealth data in Table 4. One statistic that provides a useful point of reference
is the mean actual 1992 balance in 401(k) accounts for HRS respondents: $10,808.
We can compare the average value of projected 401 (k) balances against this
magnitude. In addition, we can compare the 401(k) balances to Social Security wealth,
under current provisions, and these values are shown in the first column of the table.
Table 6 shows two components of 401(k) accumulation, or potential
accumulation, for each asset allocation assumption. The first column is the sum of the
projected 401(k) balance and the balances in any "rollover accounts" at age 65. Since
we view assets that are kept within the retirement saving system as tantamount to
401(k) assets, we group these two asset categories together. We do not report the split
between 401(k) and rollover assets, although in many of our projections, the rollover
balance actually exceeded that in the 40 1(k) account. We suspect that this reflects job
mobility rates that are too high, over some age ranges, for our 40 1(k) participants. We
Page26also report the value of "foregone saving" for each earnings decile. This is the
additional amount that would have been available for retirement support had the assets
not been cashed out. It is the value of simulated 401(k) withdrawals accumulated to
age 65 under various assumptions about the rate of return on 401(k) assets.
Engelhardt (1999) presents a similar statistic for actual lump sum distributions claimed
by HRS respondents.
The results in Table 6 suggest that pre-retirement withdrawals from 40 1(k) plans
do not have a significant effect on 401(k) balances at retirement. For those who will
reach retirement in 2025, the C(25) cohort, we project 401(k) assets at retirement
ranging from $57,900 to $181,400, depending on our assumption about how the assets
are invested. These levels are large relative to the average Social Security wealth of
$103,400 for these households, and they are much larger than the (actual) mean 401(k)
balance of $10,800 in 1992, when the HRS respondents were 51 to 61.
For each projection, the ratio of projected 401(k) to Social Security wealth varies
a great deal depending on lifetime earnings. Because the C(25) projections assume the
continuation of current low participation rates in the lowest income deciles, families in
the first and second income deciles accumulate very little in 401(k) assets, no matter
what the rate of return. Beginning with the third decile, however, 401(k) assets at
retirement would likely be substantial relative to Social Security wealth. For families
with incomes in the upper four deciles of the income distribution, the mean 401(k)
balance exceeds Social Security wealth provided at least half of the 40 1(k) assets were
allocated to stocks. The after-tax income associated with the 401(k) balance could still
fall below the value of Social Security payments for some of these households, since
401(k) distributions are likely to be taxed more heavily than Social Security benefits.
Page27If 401(k) participants invest all of their assets in stocks, and if stocks continue to
deliver returns like those in the last seven decades, then 401(k) plus rollover wealth
would exceed Social Security wealth (on average) in the five highest income declies.
Since Social Security benefits do not rise substantially with lifetime income above
roughly the median of the income distribution, it is not surprising that 401(k) balances,
which are based on contributions that were proportional to earnings, become larger
than Social Security benefits at higher income levels. We suspect that our C(25)
projections underestimate future 401(k) participation by low-income households, but we
have yet to find a way to address this difficulty.
As emphasized above, in comparing the projected differences in participation
rates by earnings decile, it is important to recognize that actual experience for particular
households could well be quite different from our mean projections, even if our average
participation rates are realistic. The dispersion of 401(k) accumulations is substantial in
every earnings decile.
The second column in each panel of Table 5 reports the value that 40 1(k) assets
that were withdrawn in the form of lump sum distributions would have attained if they
had been allowed to remain within the 401(k) system. The results show that the value
of this "foregone saving" is small relative to the value of 401(k) balances for most
earnings deciles. On average, the foregone saving is less than five percent of the value
of the 401(k) and rollover balance. For households in the bottom deciles of the
earnings distribution, the foregone saving is larger relative to the 401(k) accumulation.
This is because we have assumed that the probability of cashing out a smaller 40 1(k)
balance is larger than that for a larger balance. Households in the bottom part of the
Page28earnings distribution are more likely to have small balances than are households higher
up in the earnings distribution.
One way to place the magnitude of such lump sum distributions in perspective is
to note that the impact of a 35 or 70 basis point annual administrative charge on 40 1(k)
accounts is much larger, in terms of assets at retirement, than the impact of lump sum
distributions. The foregone saving, due to pie-retirement withdrawals, reduces
accumulated assets in the all bond portfolio by 3.5% and in the all stock portfolio by
4.4%. If we had not charged 401(k) accounts with any expenses for investment
management, the projections would have ranged from $61,200 to $209,200, or
between five and thirteen percent greater than the projections we report. That is, the
administration expense reduces accumulated balances in the bond portfolio by 5.4%
and balances in the stock portfolio by 13.3%. Thus reductions in administration
expenses could do more to increase saving than reduction in pre-retirement
withdrawals
Table 7 presents information similar to that in Table 6, except we now focus on
the C(15) cohort. Under the C(15) assumptions, the mean 401(k) balances at age 65
range from $74,300 to $247,100. These projections imply substantially larger 401(k)
assets relative to Social Security wealth for the lower earnings deciles than the earlier
C(25) projections. In the C(1 5) case, even the families in the third decile could
accumulate pretax 401(k) assets that could be an important fraction of Social Security
wealth. If 401(k) accounts were invested in assets that earned returns as high as those
on equities in the last seventy years, then even those in the fourth income decile would
accumulate 401(k) assets that were larger, on average, than their Social Security
wealth.
Page29Finally, Table 8 presents additional information like that in Tables 6 and 7,
except that we now consider the case of universal coverage for 401(k) plans. In
modeling universal coverage, we assume that all workers contribute to a 401(k) plan,
but that they may withdraw their accumulated 401(k) balance if they change jobs. One
could alternatively model the case in which account balances must be held until the
individual reaches age 65. By adding together our 401(k) and rollover balance, and the
foregone saving entry, we can evaluate the balance that would accumulate in such
accounts.
We project that universal 401(k) coverage, even with withdrawals allowed at job
change, would result in substantially higher mean 40 1(k) balances at age 65 than either
our C(25) or C(15) participation assumptions. The differences are particularly
pronounced in the lower part of the income distribution. We project mean 40 1(k)
balances at age 65 ranging from $98,100 to $356,300, depending on the asset
allocation for 401(k) accounts. Universal coverage could yield mean pretax 401(k)
balances that would exceed Social Security wealth in all but the lowest lifetime earnings
decile, at least if 401(k) investors earned returns comparable to those on equities over
the last seven decades. In the case of universal coverage, 401(k) assets would almost
surely represent an important share of Social Security wealth even in the lowest income
deciles.
The results in Tables 6 through 8 can be used to assess the importance of our
earlier modeling error in the definition of a By adding together the "401(k) +
Rollover" column, and the "foregone saving" column, we can estimate the total 401(k)
balance at retirement if there were no potential withdrawals. Appendix Table A-i
Page30reports new calculations that are comparable to our previous estimates. In particular,
our previous calculations did not allow for administrative costs on 401(k) investments.
The results in Table A-i preserve this assumption, and therefore differ from the results
in Tables 6 and 7. Comparing the results in Appendix Table A-i with those in our
earlier paper suggests that our modeling error understated the projections by about 20
percent.
All of our projections so far assume that 401(k) investors earn the same return in
every year, conditional on their asset allocation. In practice, both stock and bond
returns are random, and there is substantial uncertainty surrounding the retirement
wealth that will be associated with a given contribution history. To consider this
possibility, we replaced our assumption of certain returns with a random returns
scenario. We illustrate our findings for the C(25) cohort. In each year of our projection,
we draw one value from the post-1926 distribution of actual bond and stock returns
reported in Ibbotson Associates (1997). Because returns are now random, the
projected value of 40 1(k) balances at retirement will differ across projections,
depending on the random returns that happen to be drawn in a given projection. We
ran one thousand such projections for the C(25) cohort, and tabulated our findings.
Table 9 shows the distribution of the mean 401(k) wealth at retirement, averaged
across all earnings deciles. The entries in this table are comparable to the last row of
Table 6. The results are graphed in Figure 3. The results show that the median 401(k)
balance at retirement, especially when a substantial share of the 401(k) portfolio is
invested in equities, is below the mean. In the case of a 50-50 bond-stock portfolio, for
example, Table 6 shows a mean 401(k) and rollover balance of $98,800, while the
median value is $94,600. The mean in this case lies between the 50th and 60th
Page31percentiles of the distribution. For the all stock case, the mean is between the 60th and
70th percentiles of the distribution of realized outcomes. The most appropriate single
measure is unclear. The results also draw attention to the great differences between
the bond and stock distributions. For example, 95% of bond returns are below $85,800,
but only slightly more than 20% of stock returns are below this level.
We plan further work in the future on random asset returns and the growth of
401(k) balances. The results above, however, make clear the wide variation in potential
system-wide returns, especially stock market returns.
5. An Early Review of Post-1993 401(k) Participation and Contribution
Behavior
The projections of future 401(k) growth reported above were based on 1993 data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We now have data for 1996,
from the SIPP, which permits us to evaluate the plausibility of our 1993-based
projections. We have not yet recalibrated the projections to use the 1996 data,
because we are waiting for some additional SIPP information on pension coverage and
household net worth.
The 1996 SIPP data suggest that, if anything, our projections for 401(k)
expansion have been conservative. Figure 4 is just like Figure 1, but with two additions.
The 1996 data have been added for each cohort, and data for two younger
cohorts—C(22) and C(17)—have been added. The C(27) starting point for our earlier
projections is circled. It is clear that eligibility rates have continued to rise. The figure
shows age-specific 401(k) eligibility rates for different age cohorts.
Figure 5 shows participation rates for these same cohorts, including the 1996
data. The participation rate increases between 1993 and 1996 were very substantial.
Page32Following the dotted lines on the figure can identify differences between the
participation rates of successive cohorts at selected ages. For example, the
participation rate of persons in the C(27) cohort at age 38 was about ten percentage
points higher that the rate of persons in the C(32) cohort at age 38. The difference
between the C(17) and C(22) cohort at age 28 is 8 percentage points. Recall that our
projections assume that 401(k) participation rises by twenty percentage points every ten
years. Note that while we refer to the latest data as being from 1996, in fact, these
data were collected closer to 2 1/2 years after the 1993 survey. Thus the annual
increase in eligibility has been greater than the graphical comparison implies.6
Figure 5 includes the information in Figure 2 as well as 1996 data and data for
the C(22) cohort. The actual eligibility rate of the C(27) cohort at age 38 is in fact
somewhat greater than our projected rate. In addition, the C(22) rate at age 33 is well
above the projected rate for the C(25) cohort at that age. These comparisons suggest
that our projections are conservative, at least over their first few years. One of our
future plans is to use the 1996 data, along with new SIPP-based information on asset
balances, to recalibrate our benchmark participation and contribution rates for different
ages.
6.Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper presents new evidence on amount of retirement saving that currently-
working households are likely to accumulate in their 40 1(k) plans. Today's young and
middle aged households have much higher 40 1(k) participation rates than current
retirees did at similar ages. In addition, the rate of 401(k) participation has risen and
seems likely to continue to rise for all age groups. As a result, 401(k) saving is likely to
Page33play a much larger part in the financial preparation for retirement of future retirees than
of current and past retirees.
We present new estimates of the amount of such saving that households
reaching age 65 in 2025, and in 2035, are likely to accumulate. We improve on
previous estimates by explicitly recognizing the possibility of pre-retirement withdrawals
from the 401(k) system through lump-sum distributions, and by allowing for asset
management costs associated with 401(k) accounts. We find that lump sum
distributions have a relatively small impact on the amount of saving that households
accumulate in 401(k) accounts. The possibility of taking lump-sum distributions
appears to reduce retirement accumulations by only about five percent relative to what
they would be if households were prevented from taking such distributions. This effect
is smaller than the effect of allowing for modest administrative expenses for these
accounts.
Our calculations assume that participation and contribution behavior would be
the same if there were no lump sum distributions as they are at present. In fact, the
option of withdrawing assets as a lump sum may encourage 401(k) participation by
some households. Recognizing the potential effect of 401(k) plan provisions on
participation decisions is a topic we reserve for future work.
Projecting the average 401(k) account balance for those who will retire two and
three decades into the future is necessarily fraught with great uncertainty. Some
sources of uncertainty, such as systematic changes in household attitudes toward
saving, or reforms of the Social Security system that alter the basic structure of financial
preparation for retirement, are difficult to predict. There are other sources of
uncertainty in our projections, however, that can be reduced with further empirical work.
Page34One difficulty with our current algorithm is that it is based on data that are less
reliable for younger individuals than for older ones. With respect to lump sum
distributions, the Current Population Survey only asks individuals over age 40 about
their pension benefits and past lump-sum payouts. The Health and Retirement Survey,
the other premier source of information on pension benefits, is limited because the
basic sampling frame was individuals between the ages of 51 and 62 in 1992. Although
the HRS includes retrospective questions that elicit some data on employment
transitions before individuals joined the HRS panel, there is naturally some concern
about the quality of the resulting data for job separations that occurred long ago. Job
transitions that occur early in an individual's career typically do not involve large 401(k)
balances, but because there are many years remaining before the individuals receiving
these balances would retire, they could grow to represent substantial retirement
resources.
A second area in which our algorithm could be improved is in the link between
job separation and job tenure. Jobs that have already lasted a long time tend to have
lower probabilities of ending than "younger" jobs. At the moment, our algorithm allows
for age-dependent probabilities of job separation, but we have not allowed for an
individual's job tenure, or an individual's earnings decile, to affect the probability of a job
transition and the associated possibility of a 40 1(k) withdrawal. The ideal database for
our purposes would identify workers who participate in 401(k) plans and then permit
estimates of job change probabilities conditional on age, earnings, and the worker's job
tenure. The significant expansion of the set of questions about pension coverage in the
1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation should provide much of the
information that is needed for such a detailed calculation.
Page35Finally, our analysis has focused on retirement as an event that occurs at age
65. In practice, some 401(k) participants are likely to leave the labor force before that
age, and therefore to begin drawing down their 40 1(k) account balances earlier than our
assumptions imply. Other workers may remain in the labor force after age 65,
particularly in future decades when the Social Security retirement age is higher than at
present. For these workers, 401(k) assets are likely to be larger than our projections
suggest, both because they will have more years for accruing tax-deferred returns and
because they will contribute for more years than our calculations suggest. Allowing for
a distribution of retirement ages is something we hope to incorporate in future versions
of our algorithm.
In addition, although we give some attention to the system-wide risk due to
randomness in market returns, we do not treat the additional individual risk due to
401(k) participation and individual asset allocation decisions.
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Page38Table 1: Uses of Lump Sum Pension Plan Distributions Reported in September
1994 CPS Supplement





Retirement Saving 2.32 33.9%
Business or Home Expansion, or
Repaying Debts
1.46 21.3
Other Saving or Investments 1.25 18.2
Current Spending 1.82 26.6
Total Identifying Primary Use 6.85 100.0
Multiple Uses 1.53 ----
Other Uses or No Response 0.73 ----
TOTAL 9.10 ----
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1995), Table C5.
Page 39Table 2: Probability of Leaving a Job at Various Ages, Conditional on Job








Source: Authors' tabulations using Wave 1 of the Health and Retirement Survey.
Table 3: Probability of Cashing Out a Defined Contribution Plan, Conditional on
Opportunity to Withdraw
Funds and on Size of Defined Contribution Balance











50000-1 00000 41 4.88
> 100000 34 2.94
ALL 347 23.92
Source: Tabulations from the Health and Retirement Survey by Constantijn Panis.



























First 270238208721 39162 9679 44964 620 61517
Second 228538 154438 40002 11114 27692 1025 74100
Third 251170 167115 34394 9857 27194 2648 84055
Fourth 269872 176423 36749 10586 29904 2192 93449
Fifth 301348 199755 52522 20754 36609 4049101593
Sixth 378252 270121 75745 21483 45592 6366108131
Seventh415763 301077 94361 31245 4602911322114686
Eighth 479383 354268 105368 40228 6142313514125115
Ninth 590440458410 133091 44373 8419219767132030
Tenth 1007740 864328 21905510944114827748709143412
ALL 415833 312441 82212 30465 5472410808103392
Source: Authors' tabulations from 1992 Health and Retirement Survey, Wave 1. All
entries are measured in 1992 dollars.
Note: The sample includes all families with head aged 51 to 61, at least one member
employed, and having matched Social Security records. The Social Security wealth
does not include the value of spousal survivorship benefits. It is the sum of benefits
based on the husband's and the wife's earnings.
Page41Table 5: Mean of Simulated 401(k) Balances, and 401(k) Plus Rollover





Means of Simulated 401(k)
Balances
Means of Simulated 401(k)
and Rollover Balances
Bonds50-50S&P 500Bonds 50-50
First 620 164 175 185 183 196 208
Second 1025 666 710 753 755 809 862
Third 2648 1677 1794 1908 1968 2110 2251
Fourth 2192 2665 2853 3038 3133 3373 3621
Fifth 4049 4205 4504 4797 5023 5407 5781
Sixth 6366 6467 6929 7383 7743 8341 8924
Seventh 11322 9407 10079 10739 11316 12184 13038
Eighth 13514 13990 14997 15987 16766 18027 19289
Ninth 19767 20612 22106 23574 24806 26716 28619
Tenth 48709 29677 31788 33863 35944 38688 41409
All 10808 8953 9593 10223 10764 11585 12400
Source: Authors' tabulations and projections from 1992 Health And Retirement Survey.
Table 6: Projected Mean 401(k) and "Rollover" Balances at Retirement, and
Foregone Saving Due to 401(k) Withdrawals: C(25) Cohort with 35 Basis Point



















First 61.5 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.3 2.7 0.6
Second 74.1 5.1 0.5 9.2 0.9 17.3 1.8
Third 84.1 11.7 0.9 20.7 1.6 38.8 3.1
Fourth 93.4 22.1 1.4 38.8 2.5 72.9 4.8
Fifth 101.6 29.4 1.6 50.7 3 93.9 6.1
Sixth —108.1 40.2 2 69.2 3.8 128 7.8
Seventh 114.7 67.4 2.4 116.6 4.8 216.4 10.1
Eighth 125.1 89.3 3.2 153.5 6.3 283.4 13.2
Ninth 132.0 123.4 3.7 210.5 7.7 386.7 16.1
Tenth 143.4 189.4 4.8 317.6 9.5 574.2 19.6
TOTAL 103.4 57.9 2.1 98.8 4 181.4 8.3
Note: All entries in thousands of 1992 dollars
Page 42Table 7: Projected Mean 401(k) and "Rollover" Balances at Retirement, and
Foregone Saving Due to 401(k) Withdrawals: C(15) Cohort with 35 Basis Point




















First 61.5 2 0.4 3.8 0.8 7.5 1.6
Second 74.1 10.7 1.1 19.4 2.1 37.6 4.2
Third 84.1 21.8 1.7 39.6 3 76.5 6.2
Fourth 93.4 36.7 2.3 66.3 4.3 128.1 8.8
Fifth 101.6 47.3 2.5 84 5 160.1 10.6
Sixth 108.1 61.7 3 109.3 6 207.8 12.9
Seventh 114.7 89.7 3.4 159.5 6.9 304.7 14.9
Eighth 125.1 112.4 4.2 198.4 8.7 377 18.7
Ninth 132.0 145.6 4.5 255 9.6 482 20.5
Tenth 143.4 215.4 5.6 370.7 11.5 689.9 24.2
TOTAL 103.4 74.3 2.9 130.6 5.8 247.1 12.2
Note: All entries in thousands of 1992 dollars.
Pa2e 43Table 8: Projected Mean 401(k) and "Rollover" Balances at Retirement, and
Foregone Saving Due to 401(k) Withdrawals Assuming Universal 401(k)







All Bond Portfolio 50-50 Bond/Stock











First 61.5 11.3 2.5 22.4 4.9 47.3 10.1
Second 74.1 33.1 3.6 64.7 7.3 134.5 15.6
Third 84.1 49.9 4 96.3 8.1 198.4 17.9
Fourth 93.4 65.2 4.4 124.5 8.9 254.8 18.9
Fifth 101.6 80.6 4.6 151.5 9.7 305.7 21.8
Sixth 108.1 95.9 5.1 178.4 10.6 356.7 24
Seventh 114.7 113.5 4.6 209.3 9.7 415.7 21.9
Eighth 125.1 133.9 5.4 244.2 11.4 480.8 25.7
Ninth 132.0 163.6 5.4 295.5 11.6 577.2 25.6
Tenth 143.4 234 6.5 413.3 13.6 792.1 29.1
TOTAL 103.4 98.1 4.6 180 9.6 356.3 21.1
Note: Allentries in thousands of 1992 dollars.
Page 44Table 9: Distribution of Projected Mean 401(k) and "Rollover" Balances at
Retirement, and Foregone Saving Due to 401(k) Withdrawals: C(25) Cohort,
1,000 Draws from Empirical Distribution of Returns Adjusted for



















5 39.9 1.3 50.3 1.8 49.6 1.7
10 43.3 1.4 57.7 2.1 60.6 2.2
20 46.4 1.6 68.1 2.5 81.6 3.1
30 49.7 1.7 76.7 2.9 102.2 4.1
40 52.1 1.8 83.7 3.3 123.5 5.1
50 56.1 1.9 94.6 3.7 145.8 6.3
60 59.1_ 2.1 103.5 4.2 177.1 7.8
70 63.1 2.3 115.1 4.7 211.4 9.6
80 68.8 2.5 127.9 5.4 255 12.2
90 76.6 2.8 149 6.5 345 16.9
95 85.8 3.2 178.3 7.8 450.2 27.2
Note: All entries in thousands of 1992 dollars.
Appendix Table Al: Projected 401(k) Balances at Retirement Reported in
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998a)
Earnings
Decile
Cohort C(25) (Age65 in 2025) Cohort C(15) (Age 65 in 2035)
Bonds 50-50 Stocks Bonds 50-50 Stocks
First 974 1839 3699 2556 4927 10123
Second 5759 10691 21175 12605 24000 48841
Third 13092 24173 47843 24506 46469 94560
Fourth 24820 45500 89863 41142 77766 158417
Fifth 32848 59385 115971 53390 99686 201061
Sixth 45282 81172 159549 69710 129458 260355
Seventh 74286 134308 262478 98953 184478 372183
Eighth 98624 177764 346543 124006 229812 461382
Ninth 134707 240686 465290 159150 292720 583877
Tenth 204271 357826 680483 233532 420937 825739
All 63466 113394 219289 81955 151034 301654
Note: Authors' calculations as described in the text. Results for Universal 401(k)
Participation are the same as those in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998a).
Pafle 451. See U.S. Department of Labor [1997]. The form 5500 reports tabulate contributions to private
sector 40 1(k) plans. They do not include contributions to section 457 (public sector) or 403(b)
(non-profit) plans, or public employees' contributions to 40 1(k) plans.
2. We projected participation for all ages of the C(15) cohort by adding a constant term to the
participation probit equation so that the C(25) projections for the 5111 and 6" income deciles would
increase by 20 percentage points. The same constant term was added to the probit equations for
all income deciles. The highest deciles don't increase by 20 points because of the upper limit of
100 percent. The lower deciles are increased less than 20 points, because of the properties of the
probit functional form.
3. These data were obtained from the CPS Utilities, provided to us by Unicon Inc. We actually
construct a "synthetic HRS" sample of persons age 41 to 51 in each of the 10 earnings deciles in
1982. This sample is "aged" through 1992, assigning families to participate and contribute to a
401(k) at rates determined by the estimates from the SIPP and the CPS and recognizing the
possibility ofjob terminations.
4. This is a significant assumption, since in fact relative household income does vary from year to
year. Whether such variation matters substantially for 40 1(k) accumulations over a lifetime is an
issue we hope to consider in the future.
5. The actual survey dates and the number of "years" after the 1984 wave 4, which was
interviewed between September and December 1994, are as follows: 1985 Wave 7 and 1986
Wave 4, January-April 1987 (2 years); 1990 Wave 4, February-May 1991 (6 years); 1991 Wave 7
and 1992 Wave 4, February- May 1993 (8 years); and 1993 Wave 9, October 1995-January 1996
(11 years).
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